We live in a "new Cold War" characterized by increased global tensions between the US imperium and its allies on the one side, and the non-aligned nations (Russia, China, Brazil, etc.) on the other.
Japan is firmly aligned with the US, despite recent efforts to thaw relations with Russia.
Japan's efforts to revise its constitution must be understood in this context. Proposed revisions are not popular domestically, although they enjoy support from Japan's hawks:
Below find my analysis of Japan's proposed constitutional revisions. I've had trouble with formatting so it might be easier to read them in a pdf linked here https://www.dropbox.com/s/97xnd5cujv0qu0r/Japan's%20Constitutional%20Revisionism%20Final%20April%202016.pdf?dl=0):
ASAHI POLL: Majority of voters feel no need to revise Constitution. The Asahi Shimbun, May 3, 2016, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201605030043.html
by Dr. Majia Nadesan
The U.S.-drafted Japanese Constitution has remained unaltered since its
promulgation in November, 1946.[i]
However, successive Japanese administrations have reinterpreted the Constitution
to expand the nation’s “defense” capabilities across time. Complex dynamics
drive these revisions, among them are (1) military-industrial interests and
aspirations, (2) geo-political tensions with Russia, China and North Korea
(including territorial disputes) and, relatedly, (3) the nature of the security
relationship between Japan and the US institutionalized after World War II.
My comments focus on these specific factors driving efforts toward Constitutional
revision and situate them within a resurgent Cold War context that precludes
the global cooperation needed to address human-wrought exigencies. Accordingly,
I argue that Japan’s Constitutional revisions must be understood in relation to
efforts to preserve the global economic order established after Bretton Woods
and reformed over the last thirty years by neoliberal and neomercantile
strategies of expropriation.[ii]
In February of 2016, Shinzo Abe of
the LDP made an explicit call to revise Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution based
on a revised draft developed in April 2012.[iii] Article 9 under Chapter II “Renunciation of
Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an
international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce
war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means
of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential,
will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be
According to The Japan Times (February 2016), the rationale for change was the
existing contradiction between the wording of this renunciation on the one
hand, and the real world existence of the Self-Defense Forces on the other hand[v]:
Abe told the House of Representatives Budget
Committee that the Constitution was created during the U.S. Occupation after
World War II and that “some parts do not fit into the current period.” “There
is the view that (Japan should) address the situation in which 70 percent of
constitutional scholars suspect the SDF is in violation of the Constitution,”
he said. “Given the view that we should change this with our own hands, the LDP
has announced a draft revised constitution.” [vi]
The Mainichi newspaper reported March 2, 2016 that Abe wants to modify the Constitution while in office, especially its “emergency provision”:[vii]
Abe did not specifically say which part of the Constitution he thinks should be revised. But he is believed to be seeking inclusion of a so-called "emergency provision" in the Constitution that would, for example, extend the terms of office of Diet members and strengthen the authority of a prime minister in case of emergency such as an attack by a foreign power or major disaster. Some scholars have pointed out the constitutional amendment is not necessary to deal with emergencies because specific legislation has been enacted to that end. The provision is also feared to heavily restrict people's rights during contingencies.[viii]
Efforts to actually alter the Constitution haven’t yet materialized, but the Abe administration has officially re-interpreted it with security legislation enabling expanded deployment of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. Two new security laws enacted in 2016 re-interpreted the Constitution to allow Tokyo to exercise its right to collective self-defense: “Two new security laws went into effect in March 2016 allowing Tokyo to “exercise its right to collective self-defense without breaking the Constitution.”[ix] The new laws allow expanded deployment of the Self-Defense Forces to support allies, especially through logistical support:
With the enforcement of the legislation, Japan will be allowed to exercise the right to collective self-defense, which has not so far been permitted as it is regarded as the use of force banned under the war-renouncing Constitution. The legislation will also enable Japan to extend logistic support for foreign militaries and expand the scope of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)'s United Nations-backed peacekeeping activities.[x]
However, the laws limit SDF deployments to particular circumstances, as illustrated by the need to defend an ally when failure to act could jeopardize Japan’s security. Japan’s Defense Minister General Nakatani told journalists his forces won’t be deployed soon for military exercises or peacekeeping operations because rules of engagement for Japanese troops to respond to armed attacks have not yet been formalized, as reported here by The Japan Times March 29, 2016:
The laws allow SDF personnel on PKO missions to rescue civilians, such as those working for nongovernmental organizations, and assist soldiers of foreign militaries who are in danger.
The SDF is expected to engage in such operations in South Sudan, where Japanese troops have been serving six-month rotations with the United Nations Missions in Sudan (UNMISS) since 2012.[xi]
The new security laws were promoted as improving the US-Japan alliance, but were looked upon with concern by anti-war advocates in Japan and by Japan’s neighbors, especially China.
Many observers see the new security legislation as serving a US-sponsored agenda. The Mainichi reported that Japan’s SDF had allegedly promised US Department of Energy Secretary Poneman that new security legislation would pass by summer of 2015 in a secret document[xii]:
Defense Ministry denies document suggesting SDF promised security legislation to U.S. 2015. The Mainichi, September 8, 2015, http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150908p2a00m0na004000c.html
The Defense Ministry denied the document’s existence. But there is no denying that the security legislation enacted in 2016 enables Japan to provide additional military-logistical support to its closest ally, the US.
The new security legislation was controversial within Japan and across the region, particularly among those who are wary of the “gradual transformation of the Self-Defense forces,”[xiii] as described here by The Japan Times:
Marking a historic change in Japan’s pacifist postwar defense posture, two contentious security laws took effect Tuesday that will allow Tokyo to exercise its right to collective self-defense without breaking the Constitution… Many of those opposed to the changes have called the new laws “war legislation,” fearing the nation will either enter, or be dragged into, military conflicts that are not of its making. The laws are sure to unnerve neighbors like China, which has increasingly been alarmed by the gradual transformation of the Self-Defense Forces, which are poised to play bigger roles in East and Southeast Asia.[xiv]
As noted here, critics of the laws within Japan describe them as “war legislation.” Many Japanese citizens find the laws to be unconstitutional, with polling disputes over exact levels of support.[xv] In April 2016, over 500 Japanese citizens filed a lawsuit with the Tokyo District Court suing the government over the security legislation because it allegedly violates Article 9 of the Constitution and “threatens their constitutional right to live in peace.”[xvi] A separate lawsuit was also filed by over 200 citizens with the Iwaki branch of the Fukushima District Court alleging the legislation is unconstitutional. A third lawsuit involving over 1,500 citizens is expected to be filed over the summer making similar allegations. The degree of civic activism against the new security laws indicates that the LDP faces stiff opposition to efforts to altering the Constitution directly; in this context, re-interpretation offered a run-around, but it may not stand up in court.
Additionally, the LDP administration has re-interpreted the Constitution to allow nuclear weapons, while simultaneously specifying that Japan retains commitment to the three principles of nuclear non-proliferation. Developments in constitutional re-interpretation of nuclear weapons are being followed closely by the Japanese media, as illustrated here in two accounts, the first in The Japan Times date March 19, 2016:
Constitution does not specifically ban Japan’s use of nuclear weapons: Cabinet official. 2016. JIJI Mar 19, 2016 http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/19/national/politics-diplomacy/constitution-not-specifically-ban-japans-use-nuclear-weapons-cabinet-official/#.Vu8df-aYJmw
Japan’s Constitution does not necessarily ban the use of nuclear weapons, Yusuke Yokobatake, director-general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, said Friday. “We don’t think that the use of all kinds of nuclear weapons is prohibited under the Constitution,” the head of the constitutional watchdog told the House of Councilors’ Budget Committee in response to a question from Shinkun Haku of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan. But “the use of weapons, not just nuclear arms, is restricted under domestic and international laws,” Yokobatake also said, adding that the use of nuclear weapons by Japan is unrealistic.[xvii]
The second article, dated April 2, 2016, addresses a written statement by the Cabinet to opposition lawmakers regarding the status of nuclear weapons. The Abe administration specified in the statement that Article 9 doesn’t actually ban possession of nuclear weapons:
Abe Cabinet says Article 9 does not ban possessing, using N-weapons. 2016. The Asahi Shimbun, April 2, 2016, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201604020026.html
The Abe Cabinet has decided that war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution does not necessarily ban Japan from possessing and using nuclear weapons. In an April 1 written answer to opposition lawmakers in the Diet, the Cabinet also says the government “firmly maintains a policy principle that it does not possess nuclear weapons of any type under the three non-nuclear principles….” [xviii]
The language reported by The Asahi Shimbun read: “Even if it involves nuclear weapons, the Constitution does not necessarily ban the possession of them as long as they are restricted to such a minimum necessary level.”[xix]
The Asahi Shimbun article above notes that the precedent for Abe’s revisionism can be traced to a statement to the Diet made in 1978 by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda asserting that Article 9 doesn’t preclude possession of nuclear weapons so long as they are limited to the minimal level required for self-defense. Prime Minister Fukuda hedged his comment by stating that Japan’s national principle required commitment to the three non-nuclear principles introduced by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in 1967.[xx]
The apparent contradiction between Japan’s stated willingness to interpret nuclear weapons as necessary for self-defense and a simultaneous commitment to nuclear non-proliferation is readily resolved when one considers Japan’s mastery of Just-In-Time production and the extent of Japan’s plutonium reserves[xxi] and the nation’s state-of the-art space and cybernetic technology.
Japan’s seemingly blind support of nuclear power after Fukushima and the recent earthquakes in Kyushu (over 1,000 recorded between April 14, 2016 and April 28, 2016 according to the Japan Meteorological Agency[xxii]), where Japan’s only operating civilian reactor is located, is rendered intelligible when one considers the close nexus that binds civilian nuclear energy with military applications. That nexus was made explicit in September of 2012 when Japan’s Minister of Defense, Satoshi Morimoto, asserted that “nuclear plants give us deterrent force.”[xxiii]
The fate of the Rokkasho plant illustrates the prioritization of the nuclear-security complex over other considerations. In December of 2012, two professors of geomorphology at Tokyo University announced that a 100 kilometer fault running directly under this plant was likely active, and could produce an 8-magnitude quake.[xxiv] The Rokkasho plant’s “recycling” facilities are highly dangerous and could result in very toxic releases in the wake of an earthquake.
Japan’s power structures – governmental and industry – remain committed to nuclear power and the reprocessing of nuclear fuel despite the incredible risks made clear by the Fukushima disaster and the imminent risks posed by recently heightened geological activity in Kyushu, including major, shallow earthquakes.
Nuclear intransigence and efforts toward Constitutional revisionism in Japan are accompanied by suppression of press freedom. During an April, 2016 Tokyo press conference at the Foreign Correspondents' Club, U.N. Special Rapporteur David Kaye, reported finding “serious threats” to media independence in Japan.[xxv]
Associated Press. 2016. U.N. rights expert sees threats to Japanese press independence. The Asahi Shimbun, April 19, 2016, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201604190063.html
U.N. Special Rapporteur David Kaye, finishing a weeklong visit to Japan in which he interviewed journalists and government officials, said many Japanese journalists were feeling pressured to avoid sensitive topics, and that some told of being sidelined because of complaints from politicians. "The independence of the press is facing serious threats--a weak system of legal protection, persistent government exploitation of a media lacking in professional solidarity," Kaye told reporters at the Foreign Correspondents' Club in Tokyo.[xxvi]
Kaye explained that journalists he interviewed reported newspapers delayed or suppressed stories critical of the government and retaliated against journalist coverage of Fukushima.
The rise of Japanese militancy and the attendant suppression of news media coincide with increasing global instabilities brought upon by military adventurism and competitively pitted economic zones.
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVISIONISM
Japan’s military-industrial complex stands to benefit from constitutional revisionism that removes pacifism.
In 2008, Japan passed the Aerospace Basic Law, which included a provision allowing development of space technology in relation to its “contribution to national security.”[xxvii] In 2011, Japan lifted its prohibition against producing advanced weapons for export.[xxviii] In 2012, Japan promoted the capabilities of its new missile defense system, deployed domestically and slated for export.[xxix]
Japan reportedly spent $12 billion on the system, which was controversial when first proposed in 1993 due to the cost and potential adversarial impact on states in the region. The completed system includes 16 Patriot firing units. and four Aegis destroyers armed with ballistic-missile interceptors.[xxx]
In April, 2014, in a context of rising geopolitical tensions, Japan revised its arms export policy,[xxxi] which dated to 1967.[xxxii] The revised export policy established the “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,”[xxxiii] which, according to a review in The Diplomat, “allows Japan to export arms after proposals go through a rigorous screening process to ensure that the sale would promote international peace and Japan’s security.”[xxxiv] The Diplomat cites Jeffrey Hornung, Fellow for Security and Foreign Affairs at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, who argued that by lifting the ban, Japan can lower the costs for domestic procurement (thereby providing a “stimulus” for Japan’s arms manufacturers), increase US cooperation, and “be a more active security partner to like-minded, i.e. status quo, states.”
In other words, Japan hopes to stimulate its arms industry while reducing the financial burden of escalating its arms arsenal. This is an economic win-win for the Japanese and US military-industrial agendas and complexes.
Japan is importing more arms, as well as exporting them. In 2011, Japan purchased 42 of Lockheed Martin Corporation’s F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter planes to replace its Air Self-Defense Force's 1960s-era F-4 jets.[xxxv]
US-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP AND THE NEW COLD WAR
The 2015 revision of the Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines was arguably based on reinterpretation of Japan’s right to collective self-defense.[xxxvi] The Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines were first formalized in 1979 and articulated conditions of cooperation between the US military and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. Revised only twice, first in 1997 and then again in 2015, the current 24-page agreement promotes:
· seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses;
· synergy across the two governments’ national security policies;
· a whole-of-government Alliance approach;
· cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international
organizations; and the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.[xxxvii]
The guidelines also stipulate establishment of a standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism to facilitate the two nation’s coordination and planning.[xxxviii] According to an analysis in The Diplomat published April 29, 2015, the new guidelines were vague about cooperation in “grayzones” concerning the extent of constitutionally allowable “defense” operations, but identified space and cybersecurity as two arenas with the greatest potential for cooperation.
Reinterpretation of Japan’s logic of defense to include overseas bilateral deployments further erodes Japan’s pacifist Constitution and supports the US’s pre-emptive conception of security, articulated in 2001 by Vice President Dick Cheney as the one-percent doctrine.[xxxix] This doctrine of pre-emptive security has arguably engendered an “empire of disorder.”[xl]
In 2011, Michael Klare described a “New Cold War” in Asia.[xli] In 2014, The Diplomat ran an article titled, “The New Cold War: China vs Japan.:[xlii] Japan’s territorial disputes over the ownership of islands with China and Russia illustrate regional tensions in this global cold war. The Senkaku Islands dispute with China involves eight islands and rocks in the East China Sea that are close to critical shipping lanes, important fishing areas, and (potential) oil and gas reserves.[xliii] Japan and Russia are contesting ownership of the Southern Kurils, although recent talks dispelled some of the tension between the nations that had been escalated by Japan’s boycott of Russia leveled in response to the Ukraine situation.[xliv]
The New Cold War has unique characteristics and geographic features that distinguish it from the old Cold War, but history rhymes as the US-Japan military-industrial nexus again stands pitted against Russia and China, with emerging powers aligning with the established power-blocks. For example, members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), founded in 1996, include China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia.[xlv] Observer states include Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan, although India and Pakistan began accession in 2015.[xlvi] The SCO has since 2009 sought to replace the US dollar reserve,[xlvii] ultimately seeking a “new super-national currency.” [xlviii]
Efforts to replace the US dollar reserve represent an explicit disavowal of the establishment economic order founded at Bretton Woods and honed by neoliberal reforms. The US-Japan security relationship was integral to the economic-military order established after Bretton Woods and hence the relationship will remain integral to those who seek to preserve the financial, technology, and military hegemonies established over the last seventy years.
Over course, the prospects of outright war over preserving US hegemony seem less probable when one considers the extent of economic integration that exists today as ownership globally is increasingly centralized in a relatively small group of transnational financial/insurance corporations and sovereign wealth funds.
That said, the current escalation of the arms race in Japan and in the US with its efforts to “modernize” its nuclear arsenal,[xlix] the ongoing crises in financial markets, and the ongoing de-stabilization of the Middle East[l] could create unexpected tipping points that could result in an Archduke Fernand moment.
Constitutional revisionism in Japan must be understood in this context of rising militancy and global discord. This path promises more global disorder, more displaced peoples and wasted resources, at a critical historical juncture known as the Anthropocene.
[i] Abe explicit in call for amendment to Constitution’s Article 9. 2016. The Japan Times, February 3, 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/03/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-explicit-call-amendment-constitutions-article-9/#.Vu8b9uaYJmw
[ii] See Majia Nadesan. 2016. Crisis Communication, Liberal Democracy, and Ecological Sustainability: The Threat of Financial and Energy Complexes in the Twenty-First Century. Lexington.
[iii] Abe explicit in call for amendment to Constitution’s Article 9. 2016. The Japan Times, February 3, 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/03/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-explicit-call-amendment-constitutions-article-9/#.Vu8b9uaYJmw
[iv] Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet. The Constitution of Japan, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html, accessed April 13, 2016.
[v] Abe explicit in call for amendment to Constitution’s Article 9. 2016. The Japan Times, February 3, 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/03/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-explicit-call-amendment-constitutions-article-9/#.Vu8b9uaYJmw
[vii] Abe wants to amend Constitution "while in office." 2016. The Mainichi, March 2, 2016, http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160302/p2g/00m/0fp/091000c
[viii] Abe wants to amend Constitution "while in office." The Mainichi, March 2, 2016, http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160302/p2g/00m/0fp/091000c
[ix] Ayako Mie. 2016. Security Laws Usher in New Era for Pacifist Japan. The Japan Times, March 29, 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/29/national/politics-diplomacy/japans-contentious-new-security-laws-take-effect-paving-way-collective-self-defense/#.Vvw_WnqYJmw
[x] Gov't decides to enforce security-related legislation on March 29. 2016. The Mainichi, March 22, 2016, http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160322/p2a/00m/0na/017000c
[xi] Ayako Mie. 2016. Security Laws Usher in New Era for Pacifist Japan. The Japan Times, March 29, 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/29/national/politics-diplomacy/japans-contentious-new-security-laws-take-effect-paving-way-collective-self-defense/#.Vvw_WnqYJmw
[xii] Defense Ministry denies document suggesting SDF promised security legislation to U.S. 2015. The Mainichi, September 8, 2015, http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150908p2a00m0na004000c.html
[xiii] Ayako Mie. 2016. “War legislation” raises regional, public fears amid lack of Diet opposition. The Japan Times, March 29, 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/29/national/politics-diplomacy/japans-contentious-new-security-laws-take-effect-paving-way-collective-self-defense/#.Vvw_WnqYJmw
[xiv] Ayako Mie. 2016. “War legislation” raises regional, public fears amid lack of Diet opposition. The Japan Times, March 29, 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/29/national/politics-diplomacy/japans-contentious-new-security-laws-take-effect-paving-way-collective-self-defense/#.Vvw_WnqYJmw
[xv] Ayako Mie. 2016. Security Laws Usher in New Era for Pacifist Japan. The Japan Times, March 29, 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/29/national/politics-diplomacy/japans-contentious-new-security-laws-take-effect-paving-way-collective-self-defense/#.Vvw_WnqYJmw
[xvi] Odaka Chiba and Takuro Negishi. 2016. 700 sue Japan over security laws, additional suits planned. The Asahi Shimbun, April 27, 2016, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201604270035.html
[xvii] Constitution does not specifically ban Japan’s use of nuclear weapons: Cabinet official. 2016. JIJI, March 19, 2016 http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/19/national/politics-diplomacy/constitution-not-specifically-ban-japans-use-nuclear-weapons-cabinet-official/#.Vu8df-aYJmw
[xviii] Abe Cabinet says Article 9 does not ban possessing, using N-weapons. 2016. The Asahi Shimbun, April 2, 2016 http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201604020026.html
[xix] Abe Cabinet says Article 9 does not ban possessing, using N-weapons. 2016. The Asahi Shimbun, April 2, 2016 http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201604020026.html
[xx] Abe Cabinet says Article 9 does not ban possessing, using N-weapons. 2016. The Asahi Shimbun, April 2, 2016 http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201604020026.html
[xxi] P. Williamson. 2012. Plutonium and Japan’s Nuclear Waste Problem: International Scientists Call for an End to Plutonium Reprocessing and Closing the Rokkasho Plant. The Asia Pacific Journal, May 31, 2012, http://japanfocus.org/-Piers-_Williamson/3766.
[xxii] Number of earthquakes exceeds 1,000 in Kumamoto area. 2016. The Asahi Shimbun, April 28, 2016, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201604280024.html
[xxiii] Japan Sees Nuclear Power Plants as Powerful “Deterrent” Against Foreign Attacks. 2012. Newstrack India, September 6, 2012, http://newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/2012/09/06/231-Japan-sees-nuclear-power-plants-as-powerful-deterrent-against-foreign-attacks.html
[xxiv] K. Hasegawa. 2012. Quake Risk at Japan Atomic Recycling Plant. Pys.Org, December 19, 2012, http://phys.org/news/2012-12-quake-japan-atomic-recycling-experts.html#jCp
[xxv] Associated Press. 2016. U.N. rights expert sees threats to Japanese press independence. The Asahi Shimbun, April 19, 2016, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201604190063.html
[xxvi] Associated Press. 2016. U.N. rights expert sees threats to Japanese press independence. The Asahi Shimbun, April 19, 2016, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201604190063.html
[xxvii] Nuclear Law's “National Security” Clause Must Be Dropped. 2012. The Asahi Shimbun, June 22, 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201206220037
[xxviii] Chester Dawson. 2011. Japan Lifts Decades Long Ban on Export of Weapons. The Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2011: A8.
[xxix] Chester Dawson. 2012. Tokyo Shows Off its Missile Defense. The Wall Street Journal, December 8-9, 2012: A11.
[xxx] Chester Dawson. 2012. Tokyo Shows Off its Missile Defense. The Wall Street Journal, December 8-9, 2012: A11.
[xxxi] Titli Basu. 2016. Decoding Japan’s Security Discourse: Diverse Perspectives. India Quarterly, 72(1), 30-49. doi:10.1177/0974928415618753
[xxxii] Chester Dawson. 2012. Tokyo Shows Off its Missile Defense. The Wall Street Journal, December 8-9, 2012: A11.
[xxxiii] Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressrele/2014/140401_02.pdf
[xxxiv] Mina Pollman. 2015. The Trouble with Japan's Defense Exports. The Diplomat, October 2, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/the-truth-about-japans-defense-exports/
[xxxv] C. Dawson. 2011. Japan Lifts Decades Long Ban on Export of Weapons. The Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2011: A8.
[xxxvi] Titli Basu. 2016. Decoding Japan’s Security Discourse: Diverse Perspectives. India Quarterly, 72(1), 30-49. doi:10.1177/0974928415618753
[xxxvii] The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, April 27, 2015 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/pdf/shishin_20150427e.pdf
[xxxviii] Yuki Tatsumi. 2015. 4 Takeaways from the New US-Japan Defense Guidelines. The Diplomat, April 29, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/4-takeaways-from-the-new-us-japan-defense-guidelines/
[xxxix] Ron Suskind. 2006. The One Percent Doctrine. New York: Simon and Shuster.
[xl] See Alain Joxe. 2002. Empire of Disorder. Trans. Anne Hodges. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).
[xli] Michael Klare. Tomgram: Michael Klare, A New Cold War in Asia? Tomdispatch, December 6, 2011, http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175476/tomgram%3A_michael_klare,_a_new_cold_war_in_asia/
[xlii] Shannon Tiezzi. 2014. The New Cold War: China vs Japan. The Diplomat, January 25, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/the-new-cold-war-china-vs-japan/
[xliii] How uninhabited islands soured China-Japan ties. 2014. BBC, November 10, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139
[xliv] Vindu Mai Chotani. 2015. Can Japan and Russia Resolve Their Territorial Dispute? The Diplomat, October 5, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/can-japan-and-russia-resolve-their-territorial-dispute/
[xlv] Main Page. 2015. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, last modified 2015, accessed July 16, 2015, http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/index.asp.
[xlvi] Lidia Kelly, Denis Pinchuk, and Darya Korsunskaya. 2015. India, Pakistan to Join China, Russia in Security Group. Reuters, July 11, 2015, http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/07/11/china-russia-india-pak-sco-idINKCN0PK20520150711.
[xlvii] Medvedev Calls for Use of National Currencies in Trade. 2009. The Voice of Russia, June 16, 2009, http://ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=eng&q=46798&cid=215&p=16.06.2009.
[xlviii] SCO, BRIC Urge Fairer World Order. 2009. Voice of Russia, June 17, 2009, June18, 2009, http://ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=eng&q=46845&cid=206&p=17.06.2009
[xlix] William Broad and David Sanger. 2016. Race for Latest Class of Nuclear Arms Threatens to Revive Cold War. The New York Times, April 16, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/17/science/atom-bomb-nuclear-weapons-hgv-arms-race-russia-china.html?login=email&mtrref=undefined
[l] Charles Glass. 2016. Andrew Bacevich and America’s Long Misguided War to Control the Greater Middle East. The Intercept, April 23 2016, https://theintercept.com/2016/04/23/andrew-bacevich-and-americas-long-misguided-war-to-control-the-greater-middle-east/